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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Peter Keisler was nominated to the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit by President George W. Bush three times; 
each time his nomination expired and was returned to the President 
without the Senate voting whether to confirm his nomination.1  Keis-
ler’s final nomination expired and was returned to the President 
when the 110th Congress session ended on January 4, 2009, 920 days 
after he was first nominated on June 29, 2006.  After two and a half 
years of political bickering and excuses, the Senate never voted to 
confirm or reject Keisler’s nomination.2  In essence, the Yale Law 
graduate, former Supreme Court law clerk, and former Acting Attor-
ney General of the United States, who was given the American Bar 
Association’s highest judicial nominee rating of “well qualified,” put 
his professional life on hold for two and a half years only to end up 
caught in the middle of a political warzone.3 
The increased partisanship and obstruction at the hands of both 
Democrats and Republicans involved in the Senate confirmation 
process for federal judges has been the subject of much scholarly dis-
cussion and criticism.  Indeed, the confirmation process has been 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I would like to thank my 
family for their support, especially my wife, Rinad Beidas.  I would also like to thank Jon 
Amar, Craig Reiser, Aamir Wyne, and everyone else who helped throughout the writing 
process.  A special thanks to Shaw Vanze and the Journal's Executive Editors for their ter-
rific editing efforts. 
 1 See The White House, Judicial Nominations, Peter Keisler, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/judicialnominees/keisler.html. 
 2 Although the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on Keisler’s nomination on Au-
gust 1, 2006, soon after he was nominated, it never took any further action because of the 
timing of the 2006 Congressional elections.  See Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Li-
brary, Judicial Nominations, Peter D. Keisler, http://judges.law.yale.edu/?q=node/3253 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2010). 
 3 See id.; see also Quin Hillyer, Commentary, Judge Knot Still Holds, EXAMINER.COM, Mar. 14, 
2008, http://www.examiner.com/a-1278077~Quin_Hillyer__Judge_knot_still_holds.html. 
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criticized by the President of the United States,4 Supreme Court Jus-
tices,5 both Republican and Democratic senators,6 legal scholars,7 the 
American Bar Association,8 and the media.9  Despite the furor over 
what has been repeatedly called a “broken judicial confirmation 
process,”10 the Senate has not made any changes to address the con-
firmation process problems, nor is any internal action to fix the prob-
lem foreseeable.11 
Worsening over the past few decades, the judicial confirmation 
process is highly flawed and, at times, unconstitutional.  Although the 
ideal solution would involve bipartisan cooperation within the Sen-
ate, or a bipartisan agreement between the Senate and the President, 
neither of these solutions is likely for a variety of political reasons.  
Thus, although not the ideal venue to address the Senate’s issues, ac-
tion by the third branch of government, the Judiciary, provides the 
most effective solution to the unconstitutional aspects of the confir-
mation problem.12 
 
 4 See President George W. Bush, Discussion on Judicial Accomplishments and Philosophy 
in Cincinnati, Ohio (Oct. 6, 2008) (transcript available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081006-5.html). 
 5 See John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 186–87 (2003) (discussing the problems with the current 
confirmation process, particularly with the use of filibusters to block votes on nominees, 
and noting that Chief Justice William Rehnquist repeatedly urged “speedier considera-
tion of judicial nominees by the United States Senate”). 
 6 See Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement on Judicial Nominations (Mar. 3, 2008), available at 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200803/030308b.html (urging President Bush to over-
come partisanship and make judicial nominees acceptable to their home-state senators); 
see also Arlen Specter, Justice Delayed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2008, at A14 (calling for a truce 
“in the partisan grudge match” over the confirmation process for judicial nominees). 
 7 See, e.g., Cornyn, supra note 5, at 186–87; E. Stewart Moritz, “Statistical Judo”:  The Rhetoric 
of Senate Inaction in the Judicial Appointment Process, 22 J.L. & POL’Y. 341, 345 (2006) (survey-
ing the Senate’s treatment of lower-court judicial nominees and identifying “confirmation 
process fallacies” used by senators for political gain). 
 8 See Edward A. Adams, ABA Proposes Bipartisan Judicial Selection Process, A.B.A. J., Aug. 11, 
2008, http://abajournal.com/news/aba_proposes_bipartisan_judicial_selection_process. 
 9 See, e.g., Cornyn, supra note 5, at 184; Hillyer, supra note 3; Editorial, Courting Common 
Sense:  Will the White House and Congress Find a Better Way to Nominate and Confirm Judges?, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2009, at A10.  However, the extent of this problem has mainly gone 
unnoticed by the mainstream media over the past few years. 
 10 See, e.g., Cornyn, supra note 5, at 183. 
 11 Some of the complex political reasons why the Senate is unlikely to take action on its own 
to “emasculate itself” are discussed in BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS:  
PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES 113–16 (2006).  For further discussion 
see infra Part II.D. 
 12 The possibility of, and potential issues with, a judicial resolution are discussed by Lee 
Renzin, Note, Advice, Consent, and Senate Inaction—Is Judicial Resolution Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1739 (1998).  This Comment will address some of Renzin’s arguments and update 
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In theory, a lawsuit brought against the U.S. Senate by the proper 
plaintiff would allow the judicial branch to resolve this conflict be-
tween the executive and legislative branches.  A judicial decree that 
the current Senate confirmation process, which allows partisan ob-
struction, is unconstitutional would be the first step to ensure that the 
confirmation problems are addressed by the Senate.  This Comment 
will examine the advantages, obstacles, and potential problems with a 
judicial resolution.  It will focus on the specific problem of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee delaying and refusing to schedule hearings for 
court of appeals judgeship nominees and, less frequently, district 
court nominees.  The Comment will also discuss whether a judicial 
remedy could address this serious issue without overstepping its con-
stitutional limits and why such remedy may be necessary. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Advice and Consent Clause of the Constitution 
The Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that the 
President “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of 
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise pro-
vided for, and which shall be established by Law.”13  The decision to 
have the President appoint judges and the Senate give “advice and 
consent” was reached after much debate at the Constitutional Con-
vention.14  Furthermore, because the precise constitutional meaning 
of “advice and consent” is unclear,15 the executive and legislative 
branches have battled for power in the judicial appointments process.  
This battle over the process has escalated dramatically over the past 
twenty-five years.16 
 
recent legal developments, while also providing a new perspective as to why a judicial res-
olution may be a necessary solution to the judicial confirmation problem. 
 13 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 14 The appointments process was heavily debated by the Framers of the Constitution.  See 
Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and Consent”:  A Historical and 
Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2005).  Alexander Hamilton, in the Feder-
alist Papers, argued that the Senate should only ratify or reject a nominee, not take part in 
choosing a nominee.  Id. at 127.  Conversely, James Madison, among others, argued that 
the entire appointment process should go through the Senate.  Id. at 112. 
 15 See generally White, supra note 14. 
 16 For a detailed discussion of the historical development of the politicization of the judicial 
appointments process, see WITTES, supra note 11, at 37–85.  Wittes argues that the judicial 
confirmation process changed during the Reagan Administration, and that the “ability of 
presidents to win confirmation for their judicial nominees has eroded steadily since the 
mid-1980s.”  Id. at 41. 
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B.  Overview of the Senate Judiciary Confirmation Process 
Presently, the judicial appointment process begins with the Presi-
dent nominating an individual for a vacant judgeship, which the Sen-
ate refers to the Senate Judiciary Committee (“SJC”).  In theory, the 
SJC vets judicial nominees by holding hearings and voting on how to 
report a nomination to the full Senate.  The Senate then debates and 
votes on the nominee; this debate may be subject to filibuster.17 
Although normally a nominee is voted on by the SJC and then ei-
ther confirmed or rejected by the Senate, there are a few ways in 
which the Senate can, often for political reasons, avoid officially tak-
ing action on a nominee:  the SJC chairman can indefinitely withhold 
scheduling a SJC hearing or vote for a nominee, or a Senator can fili-
buster (endlessly prolonging the debate) when the nominee goes to 
the full Senate for a vote.18  The former most commonly occurs when 
the President is of one political party and the Senate is controlled by 
the other party,19 and the latter usually occurs when the Senate mi-
nority strongly opposes the President’s nominee.20  Not surprisingly, 
Senate obstruction occurs most frequently during a President’s final 
year in office, especially the final year of a second term.21 
Senate rules and the SJC’s Rules of Procedure establish the proc-
ess of confirming a judicial nominee.  Senate Rule XXXI (1) states 
that when the President makes a nomination, “unless otherwise or-
dered, [the nomination shall] be referred to the appropriate com-
mittees; and the final question on every nomination shall be, ‘Will 
 
 17 People for the Am. Way, The Judicial Confirmation Process:  A Step-by-Step Guide, 
http://media.pfaw.org/JudicialConfirmationProcess.pdf. 
 18 See LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT:  THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS 89–100 (2005). 
 19 See John R. Lott, Jr., The Judicial Confirmation Process:  The Difficulty with Being Smart, 2 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 407, 427–29 (2005).  Lott’s statistical analysis suggests that the 
single most important factor in determining if a nominee will be confirmed and the 
length of time for the confirmation is whether or not the Senate and President are of the 
same party.  Id. at 424. 
 20 The use of the filibuster to block a judicial nominee raises separate constitutional con-
cerns and is discussed infra at note 37 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Lott, supra note 19, at 427, 443.  During the eighth and final year of a presidential 
term, the Senate majority or minority (whichever is controlled by the opposite political 
party than the President’s) knows that there is a chance their party will take control of the 
executive office in the next presidential election and that future judicial nominees will be 
more favorable to their party.  Additionally, an informal and controversial senatorial 
practice in which judicial nominees will not be voted on after July 1st of an election year, 
called the “Thurmond Rule,” decreases the number of confirmations in an election year.  
See Geoff Earle, Senators Spar over “Thurmond Rule”, HILL, July 21, 2004, at 4.  However, 
while often invoked in discussions on the confirmation practice, it is unclear how strictly 
the rule is followed.  Id. 
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the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?’”22  Further, Rule 
XXXI (6) states that nominations that are “neither confirmed nor re-
jected during the session at which they are made shall not be acted 
upon at any succeeding session without being again made to the Sen-
ate by the President.”23  Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure for the 
SJC state that “[m]eetings of the Committee may be called by the 
Chairman as he may deem necessary on three days’ notice of the 
date, time, place and subject matter of the meeting, or in the alterna-
tive with the consent of the Ranking Minority Member.”24  Thus, the 
President’s judicial nomination goes directly to the SJC, and the SJC 
Chairman decides when to hold hearings regarding that nominee. 
Before the SJC holds a hearing on a nominee, there is an informal 
senatorial requirement that the nominee’s home state senators ap-
prove the nominee, which is known as “blue slipping.”25  While the 
SJC hearings and Senate vote appear to constitute the “consent,” the 
blue slip process appears to be an attempt to address the “advice” 
component of “advice and consent.”26 
Although the formal procedure is the same for every nominee, 
regardless of the level of the court she is nominated to, the reality of 
the confirmation process is that the level of the court matters a great 
deal.27  At the highest level, Supreme Court nominees are intensely 
scrutinized politically (though not subject to the blue slip process), 
and thus have lengthy and intense SJC hearings.28  However, because 
 
 22 S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXXI, available at 
http://www.rules.senate.gov/ (follow “Rules of the Senate” hyperlink; then follow “Ex-
ecutive Session—Proceedings on Nominations” hyperlink). 
 23 Id. 
 24 153 CONG. REC. S1184 (Jan. 25, 2007); see also RULES OF PROCEDURE U.S. SENATE COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/about/committee-rules.cfm. 
 25 See Brannon P. Denning, The ‘Blue Slip’:  Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Proc-
ess, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001).  The term “blue slip” refers to the process in 
which the SJC chair sends a blue slip of paper to the home state senator of the nominee, 
who must return the slip for the nominee to get a hearing.  Id. at 76.  If a senator does 
not return the blue slip, the nomination is “dead in the water, or further action will be 
extremely difficult, depending on which practice the committee chair decides to follow.”  
Id.  The blue slip process is the result of “senatorial courtesy,” where the President is ex-
pected to consult with the home state senators prior to making the judicial nomination.  
Id. at 76 n.3. 
 26 See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 18, at 77–79.  Recently, SJC Chair Patrick Leahy stated 
that “[r]equiring the support of home state Senators is a traditional mechanism to en-
courage the White House to engage in meaningful consultation with the Senate.”  Leahy, 
supra note 6.  Indeed, Senator Leahy further stated that the reason why nominees were 
withdrawn, or had not been considered for a number of months, was because they lacked 
the support of a home state senator.  Id. 
 27 See Lott, supra note 19, at 427. 
 28 See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 18, at 95–98. 
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of a number of factors, including intense media interest and visibility, 
the infrequency of vacancies, the influence of interest groups, and 
the low number of total Supreme Court Justices, the confirmation 
process is quite different for Supreme Court nominees than it is for 
district and circuit court nominees.  Indeed, the public scrutiny on a 
Supreme Court nomination and confirmation keeps the partisan sys-
tem working smoothly by forcing the Senate to take action on nomi-
nees.29 
While the Supreme Court nominee confirmation process is highly 
public, the more frequent district and circuit court nominee confir-
mation process mostly remains out of the public eye.30  Perhaps as a 
result, the duration of the average lower court confirmation process 
has slowed dramatically since Jimmy Carter’s presidency, and the 
number of nominees who have not been confirmed by the Senate has 
increased since George H.W. Bush was in office.31 
Circuit court and district court nominees should not be lumped 
together as there is a significant difference in the Senate’s treatment 
of each.32  Overall, circuit court nominees have much longer delays 
and are more likely not to be confirmed than district court nomi-
nees.33  The reason for this discrepancy most likely relates to the dif-
ference in political importance between the courts:  circuit court 
nominees garner much more interest from political activists than dis-
trict court nominees.34  This difference allows senators, who are con-
 
 29 When one political party does not control both the executive and the legislative 
branches, the Supreme Court nomination and confirmation process is usually a highly 
contentious partisan battle, which is further amplified by heavy media coverage.  See id. at 
96.  At the same time, even less contentious Supreme Court nominee confirmation hear-
ings receive intense media coverage, and thus there is constant public scrutiny of the con-
firmation process which prevents the use of obstruction tactics.  Id. at 96–97. 
 30 While the mainstream media does not usually report on the lower federal court confirma-
tion disputes, there are occasional articles and editorials about the process.  See, e.g., Edi-
torial, supra note 9; Helen Dewar, Estrada Abandons Court Bid, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2003, 
at A1.  Additionally, Internet sites, such as www.confirmthem.com keep a close watch on 
the process. 
 31 See Lott, supra note 19, at 415–16; see also NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS:  POLITICIANS, 
ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 2–3 (2005).  Scherer 
argues that the Senate obstructionism in the confirmation process has been mainly 
caused by the increased politicization, or as she calls it, “elite mobilization,” partly due to 
the rise of political interest groups.  Id. at 5–6, 132–33. 
 32 See Lott, supra note 19, at 445; see also SCHERER, supra note 31, at 139–40. 
 33 See Lott, supra note 19, at 428, 440. 
 34 See SCHERER, supra note 31, at 122–32.  Both liberal and conservative interest groups at-
tack or defend nominees depending on whether or not the nominee was nominated by a 
President of their affiliated party.  Id. at 122–23.  However, the groups lack the resources 
to challenge every nomination, and thus focus their attention on circuit court nominees.  
Id. at 123. 
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cerned about appealing to their supporters, to fight more “controver-
sial” circuit court nominees, while confirming district court nominees 
in an effort to boost overall presidential nominee confirmation 
rates.35  Through such confirmation rate gymnastics, senators who 
have stalled SJC hearings on nominations can boast of productive 
confirmations, ignoring that a high percentage of circuit court no-
minees never even had a SJC hearing or vote. 
Overall, as the judicial confirmation process has become more po-
liticized, it has become highly contentious and slowed down dramati-
cally.  This has had an immediate effect on the number of vacancies 
in the lower federal courts, especially in certain circuit courts.36  Addi-
tionally, there is a less direct effect on the quality of the judiciary:  be-
cause the confirmation process puts a nominee’s career into uncer-
tain limbo for an indefinite period of time without any assurance of 
confirmation, there is good reason for highly qualified potential no-
minees to turn down a judicial nomination.  In the end, an increase 
in judicial vacancies will lead to a more crowded court system and a 
longer judicial process for litigants. 
 
 35 District and circuit court confirmation statistics are often cited together by senators who 
want to promote the positives of nominee confirmations, which leads to misleading statis-
tics about the length of time between a nomination and confirmation, and the overall 
number of nominees who are confirmed.  See Lott, supra note 19, at 409–10.  The misuse 
of confirmation statistics for political purposes was examined in detail by E. Stewart Mo-
ritz in “Statistical Judo”:  The Rhetoric of Senate Inaction in the Judicial Appointment Process.  See 
Moritz, supra note 7, at 365–92.  In a more recent example of such statistical gymnastics, 
Senator Leahy conflated statistics when responding to criticism about the slow confirma-
tion process during 2008, President Bush’s final year in office.  See Leahy, supra note 6 
(claiming to have “confirmed over 86 percent of President Bush’s judicial nominations” 
and “nearly three quarters” of President Bush’s circuit court nominations).  Yet, looking 
at the final numbers for the 110th Congress, out of the sixty-eight total nominees that 
were confirmed, only ten were circuit court nominees, leaving another ten circuit court 
nominations pending (six of which were pending for over a year)—a 50% confirmation 
rate.  See JUDICIAL CONFIRMATIONS—110TH CONGRESS:  DEC. 1, 2008 (2008), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives/200812/confirmations.pdf.  In contrast, the 
110th Congress confirmed fifty-eight district court nominees, leaving only sixteen nomi-
nations pending—a 78% confirmation rate.  See id.; VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY—110TH CONGRESS:  DEC. 1, 2008 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
vacancies/archives/200812/current_vacancy_list.pdf. 
 36 At the start of 2009, there were thirteen vacancies out of 179 Court of Appeals judgeships, 
and forty-one vacancies out of 678 District Court judgeships.  VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY—110TH CONGRESS:  JAN. 1, 2009 (2009), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives/200901/current_vacancy_list.pdf.  Further, 
overall in the lower federal courts, there were eighteen “judicial emergencies,” defined as 
having a vacancy for over eighteen months.  JUDICIAL EMERGENCIES—110TH CONGRESS:  
JAN. 1, 2009 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/archives/
200901/emergencies.pdf. 
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C. Issues with the Confirmation Process:  The Senate’s Obstructionism 
Interferes with Judicial Appointments 
As previously noted, there are two main ways in which the Senate 
can obstruct the confirmation process:  through the use of the filibus-
ter after the nomination process leaves the SJC, or, more commonly 
but less publicized, by the SJC never taking action on a nomination.  
Both methods of obstruction have similar results:  they prevent the 
full Senate from confirming or rejecting a nomination.  Both meth-
ods are indirect tactics that take advantage of Senate procedural 
loopholes, and, at best, each seems to stretch the Senate’s power to 
give advice and consent.  While both forms of obstruction may be un-
constitutional, this Comment will only briefly discuss the issues with 
filibusters, and then focus on SJC inaction, arguing that such conduct 
is both unconstitutional and potentially subject to adjudication. 
The filibuster, a tactic that is only available in the Senate, allows 
one senator to debate endlessly, thus preventing the full Senate from 
voting on a nominee; Senate Rules require that sixty senators vote to 
end the unilateral debate.37  This obstruction technique is used al-
most exclusively when the President and the Senate majority belong 
to the same party, as it allows the Senate minority to potentially block 
a nominee (and is usually reserved for the most controversial nomi-
nees).38 
Whether or not the use of the filibuster as a judicial nomination 
blocker is constitutional is a divisive issue.  On one hand, the Advice 
and Consent Clause does not require any specific action by the Sen-
ate regarding a nominee, and it does not specify whether or not a ma-
jority or supermajority is required to “consent” for confirmation.39  
Conversely, many scholars argue that requiring a supermajority to de-
feat a filibuster “effectively reorder[s] the Constitution’s allocation of 
 
 37 Thus, a filibuster requires a “super-majority” of senators to end the debate, which is 
known as invoking a cloture motion.  SCHERER, supra note 31, at 147.  The use of filibus-
ters to block judicial nominations started in 1968 to block a Lyndon Johnson Supreme 
Court nominee, Abraham Fortas.  Id. at 148.  It was not until Ronald Reagan’s presidency 
that filibusters were used to block lower court nominees.  Id.  The controversy over the 
use of filibusters to block Senate confirmation votes seemed to reach its pinnacle during 
George W. Bush’s first term in office when the Senate of the 108th Congress blocked ten 
circuit court nominees.  Id. at 151; see also Cornyn, supra note 5, at 191–93. 
 38 However, during the Clinton Administration, Democrats (Clinton’s own party) filibus-
tered a conservative nominee President Clinton had agreed to nominate as part of a bi-
partisan compromise.  See SCHERER, supra note 31, at 149. 
 39 See generally White, supra note 14. 
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executive power with respect to appointments” by increasing the 
power of the Senate over the appointment process.40 
The other obstruction method used to block Senate confirmation 
of a nominee is a SJC nomination freeze; that is, the SJC simply re-
fuses to take action regarding a nominee, as it did with Peter Keisler’s 
nomination.41  This usually happens two ways:  by utilizing the “blue 
slip” requirement42 or simply never scheduling a SJC vote.43  Freezing 
the confirmation process in the SJC is a by-product of the SJC rules, 
which allow the SJC chair to unilaterally determine hearing schedules 
and schedule committee votes on nominations.44  Because there is no 
time limit on when (or whether) the SJC has to act on a nomination, 
the SJC chair can simply refuse to schedule a vote until that Senate 
session is adjourned.45 
There has been less debate over whether or not the SJC chair 
freezing the confirmation process is constitutional than there has 
 
 40 Cornyn, supra note 5, at 201.  Further, the Constitution does specifically require a two-
thirds majority for certain matters, as opposed to only a simple majority for most matters.  
Id. at 202. 
 41 See Senator Arlen Specter, Speech on the Senate Floor Regarding Judicial Nominations 
(Mar. 3, 2008) (transcript available at http://specter.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
FuseAction=NewsRoom.NewsReleases&ContentRecord_id=7a7fe355-aa35-f429-f3d8-
a599d046c92b&Region_id=&Issue_id=).  As Senator Specter noted, the problem of not 
scheduling a hearing or SJC vote most frequently occurs when the Senate and President 
are controlled by different parties.  Id. 
 42 Using this method requires that at least one of the senators from the nominee’s “home 
state”—the state in which the nominee would be a judge—be politically aligned with the 
SJC chair and “opposed” to the nomination.  Although the blue slip policy is informal 
and somewhat controversial, it has been directly cited as a reason for delaying a nomi-
nee’s hearing and vote.  See Leahy, supra note 6. 
 43 Although both methods require the SJC chair to refuse to schedule a hearing or vote, if 
neither home state senator opposes the nominee, or if there is no home state senator (for 
example, if the nomination is for the District of Columbia Circuit or District Court), then 
the chair cannot use the blue slip as an excuse for the freeze. 
 44 The SJC chair alone controls the committee schedule, and thus wields enormous power 
over the judicial confirmation process.  See 153 CONG. REC. S1184 (2007); see also discus-
sion supra note 24 and accompanying text.  Because there is no set procedure for forcing 
the SJC to hold a confirmation hearing, frustrated senators have used other tactics, such 
as threats to hold up future legislation, as ways to put pressure on the chair to take action.  
See Keith Perine & Seth Stern, Senate Tiff over Judges Gets Personal, CONG. Q. TODAY, Apr. 
10, 2008,  available at http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?parm1=5&docID=news-
000002701274.  It should be also be noted that similar delay tactics were used in the late 
1990s to block President Clinton’s judicial nominations.  See SCHERER, supra note 31, at 
137–39. 
 45 This is the course of events that occurred with Peter Keisler; because Senator Leahy re-
fused to take action on his nomination for almost two years, Keisler’s nomination was re-
turned to the White House.  See Specter, supra note 41; see also VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY—110TH CONGRESS:  DEC. 1, 2008, supra note 35. 
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been over whether use of a filibuster is constitutional.46  From one 
perspective, the SJC is responsible for vetting the nominees and rec-
ommending to the full Senate whether or not to confirm the nomi-
nation, and since the SJC chair is not violating any Senate or Com-
mittee rule, simply not acting on a nominee is an inherent part of the 
advice and consent process.  Indeed, SJC obstruction usually occurs 
when the President selects a nominee without first getting “advice” 
(i.e., negotiating a bipartisan agreement or compromise) from stra-
tegic senators.47  From this perspective, the text of the Constitution 
does not require that the Senate act on a nomination, but does re-
quire that the Senate give advice on a nominee.48 
From the opposite perspective, freezing the confirmation process 
is unconstitutional because “advice and consent” at the very least re-
quires a vote to confirm or reject a nomination.49  Indeed, allowing 
one senator to prevent a confirmation vote on a nominee seems to 
aggrandize the power of the Senate and ignore that the Constitution 
authorizes the Senate—not an individual senator—to give advice and 
consent.50  Further, unlike the constitutional issues with filibuster ob-
struction, this method of obstruction is a direct by-product of a loop-
hole in the Senate rules.  That is to say, although now considered 
something of a senatorial norm and a standard part of the political 
confirmation process, the intentional lack of response to the question 
“will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?” is not an op-
 
 46 This difference is most likely because using a filibuster to block a nominee is a publicized 
overt act, while SJC delay is inaction that remains out of the public spotlight. 
 47 See SCHERER, supra note 31, at 137–47 (examining delay tactics used during the Clinton 
and Bush administrations); see also Denning, supra note 25, at 90.  Denning states that the 
blue slip “has evolved as an effective mechanism for the enforcement of the norm that 
presidents are to seek the advice of senators before making judicial nominations.”  Id. at 
101. 
 48 See White, supra note 14, at 147 (“Despite suggestions by the President, various Senators, 
and numerous commentators that the Senate has a constitutional obligation to act on ju-
dicial nominations, the text of the Constitution contains no such obligation.”). 
 49 See Todd F. Gaziano, Dir., Ctr. for Legal and Judicial Studies, Statement before the House 
Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution (Oct. 10, 2002).  Gaziano argues 
that a full Senate vote on each nominee should be required “as a matter of prudence and 
in keeping with the comity that is required of each branch of government to the others, 
whether the Constitution or the Senate’s current rules requires such a vote or not.”  Id.  
Further, a full Senate vote is even more constitutionally necessary when it is apparent that 
a majority of senators would confirm the nominee.  Id. 
 50 See Denning, supra note 25, at 88–90.  In theory, the blue slip process allows the power to 
block a judicial nominee to shift from the SJC chair to any home state Senator.  Denning 
argues that the blue slip process “dilutes the power of the executive,” and “diffuses re-
sponsibility and reduces transparency in the process.”  Id. at 89. 
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tion that is provided for in the official Senate procedure.51  Addition-
ally, some scholars argue that the Framers of the Constitution in-
tended the Senate to have a narrow role in the Appointment Process, 
and it thus should not be able to block a nomination simply by refus-
ing to take action.52 
In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton directly addressed the 
role of the Senate in the appointment process, stating that the Senate 
only had the power to “ratify” or “reject” the nominee: 
It will be the office of the President to nominate, and, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, to appoint.  There will, of course, be no exertion of 
choice on the part of the Senate.  They may defeat one choice of the Execu-
tive, and oblige him to make another; but they cannot themselves 
choose—they can only ratify or reject the choice he may have made.  They might 
even entertain a preference to some other person at the very moment 
they were assenting to the one proposed, because there might be no pos-
itive ground of opposition to him; and they could not be sure, if they 
withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would fall upon 
their own favorite, or upon any other person in their estimation more 
meritorious than the one rejected.53  
From Hamilton’s statements, it is evident that he did not think the 
Senate had the power to do anything other than confirm or deny a 
nomination; in fact, he stated that they may have to confirm a nomi-
nee because there was no “positive ground of opposition to him.”54  
From this perspective, refusing to vote to confirm a nominee cannot 
be construed as rejecting a judicial nominee, because such a tactic is 
 
 51 See S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXXI (1), supra 
note 22.  Part 6 of Rule XXXI states: 
[N]ominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the session at which they 
are made shall not be acted upon at any succeeding session without being again 
made to the Senate by the President; and if the Senate shall adjourn or take a re-
cess for more than thirty days, all nominations pending and not finally acted upon 
at the time of taking such adjournment or recess shall be returned by the Secre-
tary to the President, and shall not again be considered unless they shall again be 
made to the Senate by the President. 
  Id.  Although somewhat ambiguous on the issue, it is highly doubtful that this rule was 
meant to address nominations that were intentionally neither confirmed nor rejected.  
This rule is more likely meant to address failed good faith attempts for the SJC to provide a 
recommendation on a nominee because of the timing of the receipt of the nomination. 
 52 See Dr. John C. Eastman, Dir., Claremont Inst. Ctr. for Constitutional Jurisprudence, 
Statement before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution (Oct. 10, 2002).  
Dr. Eastman argues that the Framers intended the President to have the “pre-eminent 
role” in appointing judges, and the Senate “would have a limited power to withhold con-
firmation as a check against political patronage.”  Id. 
 53 THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (em-
phases altered). 
 54 Id. 
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designed specifically to prevent voting to confirm or reject the nomi-
nee.55 
The notion that preventing a SJC confirmation hearing and vote 
on a particular nominee is akin to “advice and consent” ignores that 
neither the Senate nor the SJC are actually voting “no” on a particu-
lar nominee after being sent the nomination.  The Advice and Con-
sent Clause can be broken down into two parts:  “advice,” which ap-
plies before the President has officially nominated a person, and 
“consent,” which applies after the Senate has received the nomina-
tion.  Once the President has selected the nominee, the Senate must 
decide whether or not to “consent” to that particular nominee.  If the 
“Senate” (i.e., the SJC) does not believe it was allowed to give “advice” 
prior to a particular nomination, it should vote “no” on that nomi-
nee.  By refusing to take action on a nominee the SJC is going beyond 
its constitutional “advise and consent” power.  Indeed, the argument 
that refusing to give consent—distinct from voting no—is part of the 
“advise and consent” power fails because such “power” stems not 
from the Constitution or any official Senate rule, but from the SJC’s 
exploitation of a loophole in the Senate rules. 
D.  Flawed Solutions to the Confirmation Process 
Ideally, the solution to the broken confirmation process would 
come from an internal bipartisan Senate agreement, such as the one 
proposed by Senator Arlen Specter in 2004 to establish deadlines for 
a SJC confirmation hearing and full Senate vote.56  However, Senator 
Specter’s proposal was never adopted,57 even though SJC Chair Leahy 
later agreed that there should be a sixty-day limit for nominations.58  
An internal solution of amending the Senate rules would fix the con-
 
 55 Indeed, obstructing a confirmation vote in the hope of bargaining to get a more favor-
able nominee seems to be exactly what Hamilton said was not possible, although it is un-
clear if the Framers foresaw the possibility of the Senate simply not voting, instead of out-
right rejecting a nominee.  See id.  
 56 See S. Res. 327, 108th Cong. (2004).  Senator Specter’s proposed resolution would require 
that the SJC chair work with the ranking member to establish a timetable for confirma-
tion hearings to be within thirty days after the nomination is submitted, and a full SJC ac-
tion to occur within thirty days of the hearing.  See id. § 1(a)(1).  The full Senate would 
then have thirty days for action on the nomination.  See id. § 1(a)(2).  Under this pro-
posal, thirty-day extensions would be allowed for investigating a nomination.  See id. 
§ 1(b).  This solution would prevent delay and obstruction either by the SJC chair, or 
through the use of a filibuster. 
 57 Senator Specter re-proposed this idea in his March 3rd, 2008 comments.  See Specter, su-
pra note 41. 
 58 Id. 
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firmation problem without any other branch of government getting 
involved. 
The main problem with any internal senatorial solution is that, in 
essence, the Senate would be taking away some of its own power; the 
Senate is the only body that, as a whole, benefits from the confirma-
tion obstruction.59  Amending the Senate Rules or the Senate Judici-
ary Committee Rules to insert time limits for judicial nominations 
could ultimately disarm the Senate’s power to obstruct judicial nomi-
nations and reduce the Senate’s overall leverage in the judicial ap-
pointments process.60  Thus, while Senators understand and complain 
about the issues with the judicial confirmation process when nomi-
nees they support await confirmation, they have minimal motivation 
to solve the problem as a whole.  Even at times when the Senate ma-
jority would be most likely to adopt time limitations for confirmation 
processes, they fear needing the power at a later time.61 
The Senate’s treatment of a moderate solution to confirmation 
problems proposed by President Bush in 2002 demonstrates the in-
herent unlikelihood of an internal Senate solution.62  President 
Bush’s plan would have required the SJC to hold a hearing on a no-
minee within ninety days, and a full Senate confirmation vote within 
180 days of receiving the nomination.63  While not formally rejected, 
the President’s proposal was looked at unfavorably in a Congressional 
Research Service report (CRS), and was otherwise ignored by the 
Senate.64  The CRS report stated that Bush’s plan to speed up the Se-
nate confirmation process would severely limit a Senator’s power to 
blue slip block, “a key institutional power of any Senator.”65  The re-
port reveals the conflicts of interest preventing the Senate from vol-
untarily agreeing to any type of judicial confirmation solution, con-
cluding that “streamlin[ing]” the judicial confirmation process “could 
tip the balance of power on the selection of [judicial] nominees toward the 
President.”66 
 
 59 See WITTES, supra note 11, at 112–13. 
 60 Id. at 113–14. 
 61 In theory, the Senate would be most likely to adopt confirmation time limitations when 
the President and Senate majority were controlled by the same party.  Id. at 114. 
 62 See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Judicial Confirmations (Oct. 
30, 2002) (transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2002/10/20021030-6.html). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See BETSY PALMER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS RS21506, IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SENATE OF 
PRESIDENT BUSH’S PROPOSAL ON JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS (2005). 
 65 Id. at CRS-6. 
 66 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Another way to fix the confirmation process would be for the Sen-
ate and President to work out a formal procedure for the President to 
get “advice” in exchange for quicker confirmation proceedings.67  
While this solution would be consistent with the Advice and Consent 
Clause, the reality is that the political feasibility of smooth collabora-
tion between the President and the Senate is slight.68 
Despite repeated high-profile requests for a solution to the bro-
ken judicial confirmation process, no encouraging action has been 
taken towards a resolution.69  Indeed, an analysis of the inherent 
problems with any internal solution demonstrates that the Senate is 
highly unlikely to act on its own to cede power to the Executive Of-
fice.  Thus, another remedy to fix the broken process must be ex-
plored. 
III. THE POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE OBSTRUCTION OF THE 
CONFIRMATION PROCESS:  JUDICIAL ACTION 
Using the judicial system as a potential mechanism to fix the judi-
cial appointment process is not an entirely novel concept.70  However, 
any legal action is fraught with both substantive and procedural is-
sues, including standing, mootness, the Speech and Debate Clause, 
and, most importantly, the political question doctrine.  Additionally, 
a federal judge—potentially biased from personal experience with 
the judicial nomination process—may be hesitant to get involved.  
 
 67 See WITTES, supra note 11, at 115–16. 
 68 See id. at 117–19.  Even if a formal process for collaboration is created, this will not ensure 
that the two parties will be able to compromise with each other (this type of solution 
would be most necessary when different parties control the Executive Office and the Sen-
ate).  Further, this solution requires the compromise of two branches of government; 
both the President and the Senate may view such a solution as a loss of future power. 
 69 Other ideas for fixing the judicial confirmation process which have been discussed by 
legal scholars include adopting a constitutional amendment or passing a statute govern-
ing the confirmation process.  See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirma-
tion Process is Broken, Can a Statute Fix It?, 85 NEB. L. REV. 960 (2007); Ryan T. Becker, 
Comment, The Other Nuclear Option:  Adopting a Constitutional Amendment to Furnish a Last-
ing Solution to the Troubled Judicial Confirmation Process, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 981 (2007).  
However, many of the same partisan reasons that made an internal senatorial rule change 
unlikely are also applicable to such a solution, which would be dependent on legislative 
action.  Another proposal to fix the overly partisan nature of the confirmation process is 
to create an impartial third party nominee review board.  See Benjamin Wittes, Judicial 
Nominations in an Umpireless Game:  Trusted Sources, a Complaint, and a Proposal, 93 MINN L. 
REV. 1487, 1500–01 (2009).  This idea has merit and could remedy some of the partisan 
attacks on nominees, but does not directly address the main problem of SJC obstruction. 
 70 See Renzin, supra note 12, at 1740; see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Senate, 432 F.3d 359 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (dismissing appellant’s suit challenging the constitutionality of the ap-
plication of the Senate’s filibuster rules to judicial nominees). 
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Even with these potential obstacles, the most effective solution to the 
problems with the confirmation process may require the involvement 
of the judiciary.  If the problems with the judicial confirmation proc-
ess stem from an unconstitutional aggrandizing of power, the judici-
ary can, and should, be willing to get involved to prevent such abuse. 
The following section will discuss potential litigation over SJC in-
action on a judicial nominee, including the requisite cause of action, 
and procedural obstacles to any litigation. 
A.  The Cause of Action 
In order for the judiciary to be involved in the Senate obstruction 
of the judicial confirmation, a party would need to bring a justiciable 
cause of action against the U.S. Senate.  As an underlying premise, a 
proper plaintiff71 must argue that the Senate confirmation process for 
judicial nominees violates Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Consti-
tution, and the separation of powers doctrine.72  The separation of 
powers doctrine requires that the three branches of the federal gov-
ernment—executive, legislative, and judicial—balance each other out 
to ensure than none of the three branches oversteps its constitutional 
powers.73  As has been previously discussed in depth, the Appoint-
ments Clause requires that Congress give “Advice and Consent” to 
the President regarding his nominations.74  Thus, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the Senate has overstepped its constitutional power 
to give “advice and consent” by usurping some of the President’s ap-
pointment power. 
At a minimum, the Senate’s inaction on judicial nominees raises a 
constitutional question with significant Separation of Powers con-
cerns.  A plaintiff would argue that the SJC’s obstruction of the con-
firmation process by the Committee chair intentionally failing to take 
action on a nominee is unconstitutional because it results in the full 
Senate never having the opportunity to vote whether to confirm or 
 
 71 See discussion on standing, infra Part III.B.1. 
 72 See supra Part I.C.  Renzin discusses whether or not the Senate’s actions may also be un-
constitutional by violating legislative due process, and the requirements of bicameralism 
and presentment.  Renzin, supra note 12, at 1759–73.  However, this Comment solely fo-
cuses on whether or not the confirmation process violates the Advice and Consent Clause 
and the separation of powers doctrine. 
 73 See generally Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that Congress cannot super-
vise executive agencies because only the Executive has the power to do so); INS v. Chad-
ha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that a legislative veto altered legal rights of persons and 
thus acts as legislative action that is not passed by both the House and the Senate and 
then presented to the President, which violates the Constitution). 
 74 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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reject the nomination.75  Furthermore, while the SJC inaction may 
not be a direct violation of Senate Rule XXXI, it takes advantage of 
ambiguous language in the rule, and it does not follow the spirit of 
the Rule—to give an actual recommendation to the full Senate about 
whether or not to “advise and consent” to a nominee.76  Indeed, even 
assuming arguendo that the obstructive behavior does not explicitly 
violate the Constitution, such tactics have not been authorized by the 
Senate, and thus can neither constitute a form of Senate “advice,”77 
nor be used as a strong-arm tactic to force the President to get advice 
for future nominees.78 
The Senate’s obstructionism affects both other branches directly:  
it deprives the President of his executive power to appoint, and it 
causes a “severe disruption to the judiciary.”79  Moreover, because the 
Senate is directly infringing on the constitutional power of the Execu-
tive, who has the constitutional power to appoint nominees, the judi-
cial branch must stop such behavior,80 as it has previously done when 
one branch infringes on another branch.81 
Bringing a cause of action against the Senate is fraught with po-
tential obstacles, and the federal courts have rejected the few at-
tempts to do so, mainly because of procedural problems.  In Judicial 
Watch, Inc. v. United States Senate,82 the plaintiff Judicial Watch, a non-
profit government accountability advocate (and a very active litigant), 
sued the Senate for the use of filibusters to block judicial confirma-
tion votes.83  Judicial Watch claimed that because the advocacy group 
filed hundreds of lawsuits in federal court, the Senate’s actions to 
slow the confirmation process injured Judicial Watch “by increasing 
delay in its lawsuits and adversely affecting its interest in ‘the efficient 
and proper function of the federal court system.’”84  However, the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the District 
 
 75 Filibuster obstruction techniques are a slightly different situation since this raises ques-
tions regarding whether a supermajority is required to confirm a nominee.  See generally 
Cornyn, supra note 5. 
 76 See S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See discussion supra note 26. 
 79 Renzin, supra note 12, at 1757. 
 80 Id. at 1758. 
 81 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 82 432 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 83 Id. at 359–61. 
 84 Id. at 360. 
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Court’s dismissal of the case for lack of standing,85 holding that Judi-
cial Watch “failed to substantiate either essential link—between [Sen-
ate] Rule XXII and delayed vacancy filling, and between delayed va-
cancy filling and delayed adjudication.”86  Thus, the Court of Appeals 
found that the plaintiff lacked standing because it failed the requisite 
causation element.87 
More recently, in Cogswell v. United States Senate,88 the District Court 
in Colorado dismissed89 a lawsuit brought by a citizen against the U.S. 
Senate in which the plaintiff argued that the “‘unreasonable’ time 
taken by the U.S. Senate in filling the open district court seats in Col-
orado violate[d] his ‘constitutional right to meaningful access to this 
Court.’”90  The magistrate’s dismissal recommendation found that the 
complaint failed for three reasons:  (1) it lacked proper subject mat-
ter jurisdiction,91 (2) it lacked standing,92 and (3) the lawsuit was pre-
cluded by the political question doctrine.93 
These attempts to litigate the Senate confirmation process ulti-
mately failed because the plaintiffs could not overcome the proce-
dural obstacles associated with such a unique lawsuit.  While both 
lawsuits are examples of the type of litigation which could resolve the 
confirmation process mess, both plaintiffs had weak arguments that 
they fulfilled standing requirements since neither was directly af-
fected by the judicial appointment obstruction. 
 
 85 The case was originally dismissed by the District Court for lack of standing.  Judicial 
Watch, Inc. v. United States Senate, 340 F. Supp. 2d 26, 38 (D.D.C. 2004).  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed this decision.  Judicial Watch, 432 F.3d at 360. 
 86 Judicial Watch, 432 F.3d at 362. 
 87 Id; see discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 88 No. 08-cv-01929-REB-MEH, 2009 WL 529243 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2009). 
 89 The District Court adopted the recommendation of the U.S. magistrate judge, overruling 
the plaintiff’s objections to the recommendations.  See id. at *1. 
 90 Id. at *2.  The plaintiff requested that the court issue an injunction preventing U.S. Sena-
tors from receiving their salaries.  Id. 
 91 The magistrate found that the plaintiff’s Bivens claim was “deficient” for a number of rea-
sons, including plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief since Bivens claims only provide for 
damages remedies.  See id. at *3–*4. 
 92 The magistrate found that the plaintiff failed to establish an “injury in fact” necessary for 
standing.  Id. at *5.  The magistrate rejected the plaintiff’s asserted injury, which involved 
ongoing inaction by a district court pertaining to a motion for attorney’s fees made by the 
plaintiff in 2006 (in a separate matter).  Id.  The Magistrate noted that it was unsure why 
the matter was never resolved, but that none of the parties had filed a motion for order 
or for clarification.  Id. 
 93 Id. at *7–*8.  The issues raised by the magistrate regarding the political question doctrine 
are addressed infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Potential Procedural Concerns 
This Section will address the obstacles which could prevent a liti-
gant from successful litigation against the Senate.  While the first two 
obstacles, standing and mootness, are fairly straight-forward, the 
third, the political question doctrine, presents a complex problem 
which a court could decide precludes judiciary involvement. 
1.  Standing 
In order for a plaintiff to bring a cause of action against the Sen-
ate,94 she must show that she has constitutional standing.95  To show 
standing, a plaintiff must show (1) an “injury in fact,” (2) causation, 
and (3) redressability.96  The redressability requirement may pose the 
biggest obstacle for a potential plaintiff.97 
The injury in fact and causation requirements greatly limit the po-
tential plaintiffs who could litigate SJC inaction.  To satisfy the injury 
in fact requirement, a plaintiff must have “suffered” an “invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is (1) concrete and particularized, 
and (2) ‘actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’’”98  
Meanwhile, to meet the causation requirement, the “the injury has to 
be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, 
and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third 
party not before the court.’”99  As Judicial Watch and Cogswell demon-
strated, both the injury in fact and causation requirements are diffi-
cult for citizens or interest groups to satisfy because courts will not in-
fer a connection between delays in confirmations and delays in 
adjudication, finding any connection too speculative.100 
 
 94 The Speech or Debate Clause would preclude bringing a cause of action directly against 
an individual senator, such as the chair of the SJC.  See Renzin, supra note 12, at 1777–79. 
 95 See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Senate, 432 F.3d 359, 360 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 96 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (holding that plaintiff 
environmental group did not have standing because it did not assert sufficient injury and 
claimed injury was not redressable). 
 97 The redressability requirement for standing overlaps with some of the concerns of the 
political question doctrine, and will be addressed in that Section, infra Part III.B.3. 
 98 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted). 
 99 Id. (alterations in original). 
100 See Judicial Watch, 432 F.3d at 362; Cogswell v. U.S. Senate, No. 08-cv-01929-REB-MEH, 
2009 WL 529243, *5–*6 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2009).  Judicial Watch indicates that it would be 
exceedingly difficult for any litigant to rely on a “causation” argument based on the slow-
down or workload of the judicial system.  See 432 F.3d at 362.  Thus, it is highly doubtful 
that a federal judge “unable to carry out his or her responsibilities adequately because of 
an excessive workload” would satisfy the injury in fact requirement.  Renzin, supra note 
12, at 1775; see also id. at 1775 n.180. 
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Given the decisions in Judicial Watch and Cogswell, it is likely that 
the only potential plaintiffs who may fulfill the injury in fact and cau-
sation criteria for standing are people more directly connected with 
the appointment process.  Thus, there are three categories of poten-
tial plaintiffs:  a senator,101 the President,102 or a judicial nominee 
whose confirmation vote has been obstructed.103  Assuming the un-
derlying SJC inaction on a judicial nominee, all three types of plain-
tiffs would meet the injury in fact and causation requirements be-
cause each would have suffered an invasion of a legally protected 
interest directly caused by the SJC inaction.  Nevertheless, there are 
enormous potential political and publicity ramifications to a law-
suit.104  Overall, given the limited plaintiffs potentially capable of satis-
fying the standing requirements, an action against the Senate’s ob-
struction of the confirmation process would require very specific 
circumstances and would likely need to be partially politically moti-
vated. 
2. Mootness 
One potentially fatal aspect to an action against Senate obstruc-
tion is that at some point during the lawsuit, the issue may be ren-
dered moot, either by the nominee withdrawing from consideration, 
the nominee being confirmed by the Senate, or the Senate term com-
ing to a close.105  However, the Supreme Court has held that “volun-
 
101 A senator, whether or not a member of the SJC, could potentially bring an action against 
the entire Senate for allowing the SJC chair to deny him his constitutional right to vote to 
confirm (or deny) a judicial nomination.  For further discussion, see Renzin, supra note 
12, at 1775 n.179. 
102 The President could potentially bring an action against the Senate for infringing on his 
constitutional appointment power. 
103 A nominee whose Senate confirmation was blocked could claim that she was denied the 
opportunity for a full Senate vote to be either confirmed or denied a federal judge, as is 
required by the Constitution.  To some extent, such a scenario would be similar to the 
situation in Marbury v. Madison, in which William Marbury was nominated and confirmed 
as justice of the peace but his signed commission was withheld.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803).  The Supreme Court famously found that Marbury had a vested legal right to his 
appointment, but that the Court did not have original jurisdiction to issue a writ of man-
damus.  Id. 
104 Perhaps the most difficult obstacle to any such lawsuit is the potential political conse-
quences for the plaintiff.  The negative political ramifications for any of the potential 
plaintiffs to bring such a lawsuit may greatly outweigh the overall individual benefit of 
such a lawsuit.  Conversely, the political aspects may also be an underlying motivation for 
such a lawsuit. 
105 This occurred in Judicial Watch, when one of the nominees being filibustered, Miguel Es-
trada, withdrew himself from consideration, and the other, Priscilla Owen, was confirmed 
during the course of the lawsuit.  432 F.3d at 361. 
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tary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal 
court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.”106  To de-
termine whether the court should prevent the defendant from engag-
ing in the challenged behavior in the future, the court must examine 
if “subsequent events made it absolutely clear that allegedly wrongful 
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”107 
Thus, it is most likely that, unless the Senate ensured such ob-
struction would not occur again by amending its rules to fix potential 
confirmation obstruction by the SJC,108 the issue would not be ren-
dered moot by a change in the nomination status for an individual 
nominee. 
3.  Political Question Doctrine 
The political question doctrine is the biggest impediment to a 
proper plaintiff bringing a legal action against the Senate’s obstruc-
tion of the confirmation process.  Although at first glance the doc-
trine seems to apply to this type of litigation,109 upon closer analysis 
the doctrine does not actually preclude judicial involvement. 
 
106 City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982).  In City of Mesquite, 
Aladdin’s Castle sought an injunction against the enforcement of a city ordinance which 
governed the operation and licensing of coin-operated amusement establishments.  Id. at 
288.  The district court’s ruling that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague was af-
firmed by the court of appeals.  Id. at 286–88.  While the case was pending at the court of 
appeals, the city amended the ordinance to remove the language which had been found 
constitutionally vague.  Id. at 288.  The Supreme Court held that amending the ordinance 
did not render the case moot, and that without a further injunction, nothing prevented 
the city from “reenacting precisely the same provision if the district court’s judgment 
were vacated.”  Id. at 289. 
107 Id. at 289 n.10 (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 
199, 203–04 (1968)). 
108 The Senate amending its rules to prevent SJC inaction on a nominee would make the 
litigation successful, since a change to the Senate rules was the goal of the lawsuit.  In 
fact, one of the tangential benefits of a lawsuit would be the increased pressure on the 
Senate to fix the problems with the SJC confirmation process.  As previously discussed, 
this type of internal solution is preferable to a judicial resolution. 
109 Indeed, the magistrate judge in Cogswell found that the political question doctrine pre-
cluded the court from adjudicating the issues surrounding the obstruction of the judicial 
confirmation process.  See Cogswell v. U.S. Senate, No. 08-cv-01929-REB-MEH, 2009 WL 
529243, at *7–*8, *10–*11 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2009).  However, the magistrate determined 
the political question doctrine applied based on the plaintiff’s specific amended requests 
for relief.  In his amended complaint, the plaintiff requested the court declare that the 
“‘U.S. Senate has no advice on the appointment and consents to the appointment,’” and 
asked the court to “assign a four-month time frame in which the U.S. Senate must advise 
and consent on the President’s nominated judges.”  Id. at *8.  The political question doc-
trine would preclude the court from making such a declaration, as the judiciary would be 
making policy, interfering with internal Senate procedures, and participating in the ap-
pointment process if it determined a specific time limit for confirmation hearings or 
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In essence, the political question doctrine, itself a product of the 
separation of powers, makes sure the judiciary does not infringe on 
the other branches by deciding policy issues which the Constitution 
assigns to another branch.110  Although a judge may decide to exer-
cise judicial restraint given potential conflicts of interest stemming 
from the judicial branch’s interest in the outcome, and because every 
federal judge could harbor bias based on personal interaction with 
the judicial confirmation process, a judge is not precluded from hear-
ing a case on this issue under the political question doctrine.111 
In Baker v. Carr,112 the seminal case discussing the political ques-
tion doctrine, plaintiffs brought a Fourteenth Amendment equal pro-
tection lawsuit challenging a Tennessee statute from 1901 which they 
claimed “debase[ed] their votes” because of its apportionment of leg-
islative representation within the state.113  Addressing the issue of jus-
ticiability, the Supreme Court identified six factors to determine if an 
issue is a nonjusticiable political question: 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of de-
ciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonju-
dicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking inde-
pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning ad-
herence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question.114 
Ultimately, the Court held that voter apportionment was justiciable 
by the federal court and not a political question.115 
The Supreme Court dealt with the political question doctrine 
most recently in Nixon v. United States.116  In Nixon, a former federal 
judge, who had been impeached and removed from office, sued the 
Senate.117  Nixon claimed that the Senate’s impeachment process, 
 
ruled that the lack of action constituted confirmation of a nominee.  Although the magis-
trate’s analysis is correct based on the defective request for relief, had the plaintiff asked 
for a less specific declaratory judgment that did not force the court to make policy, the 
political question doctrine would not have applied. 
110 See Renzin, supra note 12, at 1780 n.207 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)). 
111 Renzin notes that the political question doctrine provides an “easy way” to avoid having to 
actually decide the merits of the case.  See Renzin, supra note 12, at 1780. 
112 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
113 Id. at 187–88. 
114 Id. at 217. 
115 Id. at 237. 
116 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
117 Id. at 226–28. 
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which involved an evidentiary hearing before the Senate impeach-
ment committee, violated the Constitution’s impeachment require-
ments because, while the Constitution gave “sole” power to the Sen-
ate to “try” an impeachment, the whole Senate did not in fact “try” 
him.118  The Supreme Court ruled that it would not get involved in 
the Senate’s decision of how to hold impeachment trials.119  The 
Court found that this issue was governed by the political question 
doctrine because (1) the imprecise meaning of the word “try” did not 
allow the court “any judicially manageable standard of review,” and 
also did not preclude the Senate from using a committee as long as a 
two-thirds vote was used to convict,120 (2) the Constitution specifically 
intended that the judiciary would not have a role in the impeach-
ment process as demonstrated by the use of “sole,” and impeachment 
was designed to be the only check on the judiciary branch,121 and (3) 
adjudicating the case would “open[] the door of judicial review to the 
procedures used by the Senate in trying impeachments,” causing po-
litical “chaos.”122  Additionally, if the judiciary were to interfere with 
the impeachment process, there would be a lack of finality and a 
question of what relief it could grant.123 
The Court’s holding in Nixon illustrates why the political question 
doctrine would not preclude a lawsuit over the SJC’s obstruction of 
the appointment process.124  A comparison of the situation in Nixon 
with the issue at bar demonstrates why the impeachment process at 
issue in Nixon is a nonjusticiable political question but distinguishable 
from the situation at issue here.125  First, unlike the impeachment 
procedures at issue in Nixon, which were delegated solely to the Legis-
lature, the appointment power is primarily rooted in the executive 
branch, with the Senate giving “advice and consent.”126  Because the 
appointments process involves two branches of government, the judi-
 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 237–38. 
120 Id. at 229–30. 
121 Id. at 231–35. 
122 Id. at 236. 
123 Id. 
124 As has been previously discussed, the use of a filibuster as a mechanism of obstructing a 
confirmation vote, thereby requiring a supermajority confirmation vote, raises separate is-
sues.  See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
125 See Renzin, supra note 12, at 1782–83 (describing factors that distinguish the situation in 
Nixon from the situation in which the Senate does not carry out its “advice and consent” 
functions). 
126 The Appointments Clause is found in Article II of the Constitution, which enumerates 
the executive powers; Article I pertains to the legislative powers.  See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, su-
pra note 18, at 18. 
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ciary may be required to prevent the overstepping of constitutional 
power by one branch.127  Second, the appointment process impacts 
the judiciary indirectly, prior to a judge taking the bench; the process 
was not meant to be a check on the judiciary, unlike the impeachment 
process.128  Third, although “advice and consent” is arguably ambigu-
ous and seems to “lack[] sufficient precision to afford any judicially 
manageable standard of review,”129 unlike the relationship between 
the Senate’s impeachment procedure and the word “try,” the Senate 
is neither giving “advice”130 nor “consent”131 by refusing to take action 
on judicial nominees.132  Indeed, although the precise meaning of 
“advise and consent” may be a policy issue to be determined by the 
Legislature (and the Executive), the Judiciary must prevent the Sen-
ate from unconstitutionally expanding this meaning.133  In fact, there 
is direct134 and indirect135 evidence that the SJC is intentionally avoiding 
its Constitutional obligation to confirm or reject a nominee, which 
would make the timeliness issue “judicially discoverable and manage-
able,”136 without the Court needing to determine how long of a delay 
makes the SJC inaction unconstitutional. 
Moreover, unlike the impeachment process at issue in Nixon, con-
firmation obstruction is not a procedure specifically allowed for in the 
Senate Rules, which call for a final question for every nominee—if 
the Senate will “advise and consent to this nomination.”137  Thus, a 
 
127 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also Renzin, supra note 12, at 1783–84 (noting 
that courts have allowed judicial intervention to enforce a minimal amount of fair proce-
dure by the Senate). 
128 See Renzin, supra note 12, at 1782. 
129 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993). 
130 “Advice” is defined as a “recommendation regarding a decision or course of conduct.”  
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2009), http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/advice (last visited Feb. 16, 2010). 
131 “Consent” is defined as “to give assent or approval.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE 
DICTIONARY (2009), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consent (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2010).  Neither is the Senate refusing to give consent by rejecting the nominee. 
132 In fact, the Senate is taking no action at all and is thus ignoring the Constitution.  See supra 
note 49 and accompanying text. 
133 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 252–53 (Souter, J., concurring), see also infra note 150 and accom-
panying text. 
134 There are many news articles and press releases with quotations from Senators discussing 
the intentional SJC inaction.  See, e.g., Leahy, supra note 6 (“As a result, this nomination, 
which was opposed by home state Senators from the start, was one that could not move 
[to a hearing].”). 
135 An example of indirect evidence is the SJC scheduling hearings on certain judicial nomi-
nees even while nominees who have been pending for years are not scheduled. 
136 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
137 See S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., supra note 22 and accompanying text.  The Senate 
Rules instruct that, ultimately, the Senate must vote whether or not to confirm a nomi-
 
932 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
key distinction between judicial involvement with the impeachment 
process at issue in Nixon and the confirmation obstruction at issue 
here is that the judiciary would not be reviewing a sanctioned inter-
nal procedure of the Senate; instead, it would be preventing manipu-
lation and avoidance of those internal procedures.138 
The feasibility of a judicial remedy or relief does pose an issue for 
a litigant, but this problem is far less significant than it was in Nixon.139  
While in Nixon there were substantial concerns over “lack of finality” 
and the Court’s potential reinstatement of a convicted federal 
judge,140 relief for the SJC inaction on judicial confirmation could be 
limited to ensuring a Senate confirmation vote on the nominee at is-
sue and declaring such inaction unconstitutional.141  Further, a court 
might be able to declare the Senate Judiciary Committee Rules un-
constitutional, and instruct that the rule be modified.142  The Court 
has previously declared the Senate’s actions unconstitutional.143  Al-
though a judicial remedy would be difficult to enforce and may in-
crease the tension between the three branches of government, almost 
any separation of powers remedy faces similar hurdles. 
The separate concurring opinions of Justice White and Justice 
Souter in Nixon further illustrate why the Senate inaction on judicial 
confirmation is a justiciable issue and not precluded by the political 
 
nee.  See id.  Therefore, the root of this problem stems from the Senate Judiciary Rule al-
lowing only the chair to schedule committee action, with no time limit for acting on a 
nomination.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  The Senate could enact rules giv-
ing the committee power to not take action on a nominee they do not approve of, al-
though such a rule may ultimately also violate the Constitution.  However, in this situa-
tion, unlike the use of the filibuster, obstruction by refusing to take action has no basis 
from a formal Senate Rule. 
138 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 236 (explaining the problems with judicial review of the impeach-
ment process).  The obstruction by the SJC through the use of the blue slip policy is dis-
cussed supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
139 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 236 (noting that possible remedies to the case might be the rein-
statement of the convicted federal judge or the creation of a judgeship if the position had 
been filled). 
140 Id. 
141 The relief requested is important in avoiding preclusion under the political question doc-
trine.  The type of relief requested by the plaintiff in Cogswell, where the court was asked 
to “confirm” the nominee or determine a specific time limit for confirmation, would ren-
der the action a political question.  See Cogswell v. U.S. Senate, No. 08-cv-01929-REB-
MEH, 2009 WL 529243, at *8 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2009), discussed supra note 109. 
142 This remedy could include mandating the insertion of some sort of time limit to act on 
nominations.  However, because such a specific mandate may be an interference with in-
ternal Senate procedures, a court could just insist that the Senate amend its rules to en-
sure compliance with the Advice and Consent Clause of the Constitution.  A court could 
avoid inserting its own “policy” into the remedy by simply forcing the Senate to take ac-
tion. 
143 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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question doctrine.144  Justice White concurred with the majority be-
cause the “Senate fulfilled its constitutional obligation to ‘try’ [the] 
petitioner,” but he did not believe that the issue was precluded by the 
political question doctrine.145  Justice White noted that the political 
question doctrine is applicable when “the Constitution has given one 
of the political branches final responsibility for interpreting the scope 
and nature of [governmental] power,” not when the Constitution 
merely gives “exclusive responsibility for a particular governmental 
function to one of the political branches.”146  Justice White further 
pointed out that the Court has no problem interfering with the legis-
lative branch’s legislative powers when the Court believes a legislative 
act contravenes the Constitution.147  Applying Justice White’s opinion 
to the issue of judicial confirmation obstruction demonstrates why it 
is not a political question.  The Senate must provide “advice and con-
sent” to the President; the Senate does not have “final responsibility” 
or even “exclusive responsibility” over the appointment process, 
which makes it impossible to have unilateral power to interpret “ad-
vice and consent.”148  The judiciary has the ability to review the Sen-
ate’s action (or inaction) and should prevent the Senate from disre-
garding the text of the Constitution, especially since the Senate has 
not even formally “interpreted” its power to advise and consent in the 
manner being conducted by the SJC.149 
Meanwhile, Justice Souter agreed with the Nixon majority opinion 
that the impeachment issue was a nonjusticiable political question, 
but he noted that there are limitations to the application of the po-
litical question doctrine: “Not all [judicial] interference is inappro-
priate or disrespectful . . . and application of the doctrine ultimately 
turns . . . on ‘how importunately the occasion demands an answer.’”150  
Justice Souter stated that if the Senate had been holding impeach-
ment proceedings “in a manner [that] seriously threaten[ed] the in-
tegrity of its results . . . judicial interference might well be appropri-
 
144 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 239–52 (White, J., concurring); id. at 252–54 (Souter, J., concur-
ring). 
145 Id. at 239 (White, J., concurring). 
146 Id. at 240 (emphases added). 
147 See id. at 242. 
148 Although the Senate has the power to interpret “advice and consent,” it is constrained 
since the Constitution does not provide it with “sole” power to do so, as it did with im-
peachment in Nixon.  See id. at 230–31 (majority opinion).  For example, there would be 
no doubt that if the Senate interpreted “advise and consent” to mean that it would only 
confirm judicial nominees whom the SJC chair told the President to nominate (the “ad-
vice”), the Senate would be aggrandizing its constitutional power. 
149 See id. 
150 Id. at 253 (Souter, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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ate.”151  Justice Souter’s concurrence is directly applicable to the Sen-
ate’s judicial appointment obstruction because the Senate is acting 
“in a manner [that] seriously threaten[s] the integrity” of the judicial 
appointment process.152  Instead of making a good faith effort to give 
“advice and consent,” the Senate (through the SJC’s inaction) ig-
nores the President’s nomination; the Senate is neither consenting to 
nor rejecting a nominee without giving any reason for the obstruc-
tion.  The Senate’s actions in this situation are akin to Justice Souter’s 
example of the Senate convicting based on a “determination that an 
officer of the United States was simply ‘a bad guy.’”153  The Senate’s 
inaction is “beyond the scope of its constitutional authority,” which 
“merit[s] a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that 
would ordinarily counsel silence.”154 
The Senate would vehemently oppose the plaintiff’s arguments on 
the political question doctrine.  The counterarguments from the Se-
nate could focus on the Court’s interference with internal procedure 
of the Senate.  Furthermore, the Senate has the ability to determine 
how it interprets “advice and consent” just as it had in Nixon to inter-
pret “try” and could argue that its inaction on a nominee constitutes 
either its advice (being ignored) or its (lack of) consent.155  Addition-
ally, the Senate can argue that the text of the Constitution does not 
actually require a vote whether to consent to a nominee, and, there-
fore, the judiciary should not get involved when the Senate is not act-
ing unconstitutionally.156 
Despite Senate arguments against judicial action, the political 
question doctrine would not preclude a lawsuit.  The judiciary has the 
power to review the unconstitutional actions of the other branches of 
government.  As the Court in Nixon stated, “courts possess power to 
review either legislative or executive action that transgresses [the] 
identifiable textual limits [of the Constitution].”157  Here, the SJC’s 
lack of action constitutes such a transgression, and the judiciary has 
the “responsibility . . . as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution,”158 
to determine if such behavior is constitutional. 
 
151 Id. at 253–54. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. (citing Justice White’s concurring opinion at 239). 
154 Id. at 254. 
155 See Renzin, supra note 12, at 1783–84. 
156 See White, supra note 14, at 147–48 (asserting that the text of the Constitution does not 
obligate the Senate to act on judicial nominations). 
157 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238. 
158 Id. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that the Senate judicial confirmation process 
for district and circuit court judges has serious flaws that are becom-
ing increasingly problematic and partisan.  The long delays and parti-
san bickering have lead to a slowdown in the federal court system as 
fewer judges to hear cases means longer delays for litigants.  More-
over, because the most highly qualified candidates for nomination 
face the most contentious opposition and prolonged delays, the over-
all quality of the judiciary suffers when potential nominees decline or 
are forced to withdraw their nomination. 
Because the Senate has not taken any action to fix the problem 
created when the chair of the SJC refuses to take action on a nomi-
nee, other solutions must be explored.  Litigation, although fraught 
with internal and external obstacles and requiring a very specific set 
of circumstances with the correct plaintiff, is the most effective solu-
tion to produce a meaningful change to the confirmation process.  A 
judicial resolution remains the only direct mechanism for compelling 
the Senate to end its unconstitutional practice of obstructing the con-
firmation process and fix the broken confirmation process. 
Even a failed lawsuit could indirectly fix the confirmation process 
by increasing the public awareness about the issue.  If a court deemed 
a lawsuit against the Senate to be precluded under the political ques-
tion doctrine, which this Comment argues would be erroneous, the 
potential media attention from a high-profile lawsuit could itself 
bring about reform.  Increased media scrutiny could bring the cur-
rent broken process into the public spotlight, pressuring the Senate 
to fix the problem by amending its rules.  Just as media attention pre-
vents extreme delay tactics for Supreme Court Justice confirmation 
hearings, the media exposing this flaw in the confirmation process 
may prevent future delays for the confirmation process of lower fed-
eral court judges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
